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Abstract
We examine the proper scope of public-private partnerships in the context of
a project consisting of two tasks, building and operation of a facility. We investi-
gate the optimal arrangement regarding bundling versus unbundling and private
ownership versus public ownership. Like Bennett and Iossa (2006), we assume
that the innovative activity in the building stage has impacts on, among other
things, the subsequent operational cost. We relax the nature of task interdepen-
dence and study di¤erent contractual frameworks. The general insight is that
given limitations in contractibility, contrary to common sense, complementarity
between tasks favors unbundling over bundling.
Keywords: Complementarity; Substitutability; Incomplete contracts; Public-
private partnership.
JEL classication: D23; H11; L33.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, it is common across countries that governmental agencies collaborate with
the private sector to deliver public services; in some cases, even the whole project
is contracted out to a single rm that takes responsibilities for all involved tasks,
such as both building and maintaining the facility. In the literature of public-private
Chen: School of Economics and Finance, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong
Kong, P.R.China. E-mail: chinabin@hku.hk. Chiu (corresponding author): School of Economics
and Finance, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong, P.R.China. E-mail:
schiu@econ.hku.hk, Tel: +852 2859-1056, Fax: +852 2548-1152.
yWe are grateful to a coeditor and two referees for comments that have signicantly improved
the paper. We would also like to thank Kong-pin Chen, Eric S. Chou, and Ping Lin for discussions
and participants in the Far East Econometric Society Meeting, Tokyo, 2009, for comments. Any
remaining errors are our own. Financial support from the Hong Kong Research Grants Council
(HKU742407H) is acknowledged.
1
partnerships (PPPs), as this practice is usually referred to, two issues have received
much attention: multitasking and investment contractibility. Given multiple tasks 
such as building and subsequent maintenance of a facility an important question is
whether the tasks should be handled by a single consortium (in case of bundling) or
by two separate rms (in case of unbundling). This question of course depends on
the contractibility of and the relationship between tasks, as is shown in the literature.
In this paper, we further examine this question, extending the existing work.
Our paper is closely related to the piece by Bennett and Iossa (2006), in which two
non-contractible innovation activities (or investments in short), one in the building
stage and the other in the operating stage, are supposed to reduce cost and enhance
quality. Assuming a sort of task externality so that the investment in the building
stage may increase or decrease the cost in the operating stage, the paper shows that,
with positive externality, it is more e¢ cient for the tasks to be bundled; with negative
externality, it is more e¢ cient for the tasks to be separated. In another paper where
both operational costs and service quality are contractible, Martimort and Pouyet
(2008) also show similar results.
However, the relationship between tasks can be richer. They may be interdepen-
dent, being substitutes, such that making more of one investment will decrease the
returns of making more of another investment. For example, a hospital may be built
in a more specied manner so that, while the subsequent operational cost is generally
lower (i.e., positive externality), further enhancement of quality or alternation of us-
age would be more di¢ cult to achieve. The two tasks may be interdependent, sharing
complementaries, such that making more of one investment will increase the returns
of making more of another investment. For instance, a school may be built with
better-quality and more-expensive-glass windows so that, whereas the subsequent
operational cost is generally lower (i.e., positive externality), an increase in guard
services during the operating stage may be more valuable as it prevents a greater
loss from pupilsvandalism. In this paper, we examine the implications of task inter-
dependence that allows for substitutability and complementarity; another novelty is
the way we model investment contractibility, which will be clear in a moment.
To briey illustrate how task interdependence matters, let us revisit the contrac-
tual framework in Bennett and Iossa (2006). Consider the case of task complemen-
tarity. In case of unbundling, the builder could bargain with the manager or the
government. After the bargaining, the builder could share the benets generated by
the managers investment, while not bearing any cost incurred by such investment.
Because of complementarity, a higher building investment leads to a higher operating
investment, yielding a greater net surplus to be split. Anticipating more rents to
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be extracted from the managers investment, the builder has a greater incentive to
invest. As a result, investment complementarity helps mitigate the underinvestment
problem of the builder under unbundling. In the case of bundling, on the contrary,
when investing in the building stage, the consortium will internalize not only the ben-
ets but also the costs of subsequent investment, resulting in a dampened investment
incentive on his part.1 Thus, at the margin, task complementarity favors unbundling,
relative to bundling. Notice that because task complementarity can be viewed a spe-
cial kind of positive externality, this result sheds new, somewhat counter-intuitive,
light to the issue on PPPs.
In the main body of this paper, we focus on a contractual framework somewhat
di¤erent from Bennett and Iossa (2006); we assume that the operation task becomes
contractible subsequent to the building stage. Examples from construction sectors
show that the contract on service provision is usually nalized until the infrastruc-
ture is in place. Moreover, even though a contract species the operating task in
advance of the project, it may still be subject to adaptation and renegotiation after
the construction is carried out. These observations are consistent with the idea that
the requirements regarding the successive operation task become revealing as time
goes by.2 We think that the framework of "interim contractibility" is worthwhile
studying (see Iossa and Martimont, 2008 for discussions). To check the robustness
of our results, we also examine the role of task interdependence in the incomplete
contracting framework as in (Bennett and Iossa, 2006) and in complete contracting
frameworks as in (Martimort and Pouyet, 2008; Schmitz, 2005).
In the framework of interim contractibility, our ndings suggest that under private
ownership, task externality, as well as task interdependence, still plays an important
role in shaping the trade-o¤s between integration and separation. In particular, task
complementarity favors the builders ownership, but disfavors the consortiums own-
ership. The intuition is much similar to what we have discussed with respect to
Bennett and Iossas model, but the di¤erence is that, given the interim contractibil-
ity, the negotiation on the ex post adoption of the operating investment is replaced
by the negotiation on the ex ante approval prior to its choice. Through such bar-
gaining, either the builder or the consortium shares the benets (generated by the
operating investment), and the gains are in turn dependent on his own investment
in the building stage. On the other hand, we nd that under public ownership, the
1Without loss of generality, we use the pronoun "she" to represent the government, and use the
pronoun "he" to represent the rms (or agents).
2One fact, which is pointed out by Neher (1999), is that as the project matures, more human
capital is converted into physical assets, making the alienable (contractible) elements of the project
manifested.
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di¤erence between integration and separation vanishes. The reasons trace to the
interim contractibility of the operating investment as well as the veto power of the
government on the ex post adoption of the building investment.
Besides the bundling versus unbundling problem, this paper also reexamines, in
di¤erent contractual frameworks, whether the project should be privately owned or
publicly owned. In general, our main results are consistent with those in Bennett
and Iossa (2006), where a larger residual value e¤ect and a smaller social value e¤ect
favor private ownership, and public ownership is favored when the opposite is true.
The present paper belongs to the strand of literature that investigates either
desirable contracting schemes in the public-private partnership (e.g., Hart, 2003;
Martimort and Pouyet, 2008; Bentz et al, 2001; Iossa and Martimort, 2008; Hoppe
and Schmitz, 2008) or optimal ownership structures in the public-private partnership
(e.g., Hart et al, 1997; Francesconi and Muthoo, 2006; Besley and Ghatak, 2001;
Bennett and Iossa, 2006). But none of these papers has addressed exactly the same
questions as we do here.
Our research is also related to the papers that study the holdup problem of se-
quential specic investments. Like what we assume here, Smirnov and Wait (2004)
assume that, if an initial investment is made, contracting on the subsequent invest-
ment becomes possible. But they address a di¤erent question about whether the
parties should make investments simultaneously or sequentially. Another relevant
paper is De Fraja (1999), who nd that if specic investments are made sequentially,
ex ante contracting can solve the holdup problem even though there exist two-sided
direct externalities across investments.3 Here, we study the interrelationship among
three parties (namely, two investors and one principal), instead of between two, lead-
ing to di¤erent results.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main
model. Section 3 examines the optimal regime when the operation task becomes
contractible subsequent to the building stage. Section 4 briey discusses the issue
in the framework used by Bennett and Iossa (2006), in which all tasks are non-
contractible. Section 5 addresses the issue from a complete contract perspective.
Section 6 concludes.
3Disagreeing with De Fraja (1999), Che (2000) argues that the contract suggested by De Fraja
(1999) provides almost no incentive for specic investments when they exhibit su¢ ciently large direct
externalities. Che (2000) proposes an alternative contract. For other papers on the sequential specic
investments, please see Lulfesmann (2004) etc.
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2 Model
A governmental agency (hereafter, the government) is contemplating a project that,
upon its completion, will enhance social benet. The project consists of two sequential
tasks, namely, "building" and "operating" a facility. The facility of a minimum
standard can be built at a certain cost, and the completed facility can be operated at
a certain cost as well. However, prior to the actual building, the builder can undertake
an innovative activity that increases both the social benet and the residual value
of the facility, a¤ecting the costs and e¢ cacy of the following operation task (the
residual value refers to the value of the facility to the owner upon the expiration of
the project). Likewise, subsequent to the completion of building but prior to the
actual operation, the manager can undertake an innovative activity that reduces the
operational cost and increases the social benet. We use a and e to denote the level
(also the cost) of innovative activity in the building stage and in the operating stage,
respectively. The government can either engage with the builder and the manager
who are separately in charge of these two tasks, or with a consortium who takes care
of both tasks.4 In either case, these agents are risk-neutral, so is the government.
Let C(a; e) be the operational cost of the facility borne by the manager (or oper-
ator) in the operating stage. We assume that
C(a; e) = C0   d(a; e);
where C0 is the positive default cost, and d(a; e) is the reduction of operational cost
caused by the investments of a and e. The function d(a; e) is three-order di¤erentiable,
satisfying the following properties:
(i) d(0; 0) = 0.
(ii) d2(a; e) > 0, d2(a; 0) =1, d2(a;1) = 0, d22(a; e) < 0.
(iii) If d1(a; e) > 0, then d1(0; e) =1, d1(1; e) = 0, d11(a; e) < 0; if d1(a; e) < 0,
then d1(0; e) = 0, d1(1; e) =  1, d11(a; e) < 0.
This operational cost function generalizes that in Bennett and Iossa (2006), since
we allow not only the direct e¤ect of a on the operational cost but also the cross-
terms between a and e. In particular, if d1(a; e) > 0, a reduces the operational
4We assume that when the builder and the manager form a consortium, they act as one person.
This assumption is also used in Bennett and Iossa (2006), as well as in the main part of Martimort
and Pouyet (2008) that we will contrast with in Section 5. This view of integration, however, is
di¤erent from Grossman and Hart (1986). In general, integration and non-integration are di¤erent
ownership structures, and there should still be incentive problems within an integrated rm. An
alternative interpretation of our case is that we are indeed asking whether the two tasks should be
assigned to one agent or to two separate agents.
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cost; if d1(a; e) < 0, a increases the operational cost. These positive and negative
externalities are studied in Bennett and Iossa (2006). Our focus, however, is the role
of cross partials. If d12(a; e) > 0, a and e are complementary investments; in this
case, an increase in a increases the marginal benet of e. It is also conceivable that
d12(a; e) < 0, i.e., a and e are substitute investments. In this case, an increase in a
reduces the marginal benet of e. Note that in Bennett and Iossa (2006), d12(a; e)
is assumed to be zero. In our more generalized framework, there are four di¤erent
possible relationships between a and e: (i) d1(a; e) > 0, d12(a; e) > 0; (ii) d1(a; e) > 0,
d12(a; e) < 0; (iii) d1(a; e) < 0, d12(a; e) > 0; and (iv) d1(a; e) < 0, d12(a; e) < 0 (the
knife-edge cases with zero derivatives being omitted).
Three remarks are in order. First, we are agonistic as to which technology regime
is more prevalent; in any case, this is an empirical issue and can only be settled
by a careful examination of the public project we have at hand. Second, instead of
studying the choice among these four technology regimes, we address the following
question: given the technology regime, what kind of public-private relationship is
most e¢ cient. Third, to facilitate exposition, we will use the following nomenclature
unless otherwise stated. Task or investment externality refers to the case that d1(a; e)
is nonzero; in particular, positive (negative) externality refers to where d1(a; e) > 0
(d1(a; e) < 0)). Task or investment interdependence refers to the case that d12(a; e) is
nonzero; in particular, complementarity (substitutability) refers to where d12(a; e) >
0 (d12(a; e) < 0).
Next we assume that the project generates the following social benets:5
B(a; e) = B0 + u(a) + v(e);
whereB0 is the positive default benet; u(0) = v(0) = 0; u0(a); v0(e) > 0; u00(a); v00(e) <
0; u0(0) = v0(0) =1; u0(1) = v0(1) = 0.
The residual value of the facility is claimed and taken away by the owner when
the project expires. For simplicity, we continue to assume that this value depends on
a but not on e; given the choice of a, the residual value equals
R(a) = R0 + t(a);
where R0 is the positive default residual value, t(0) = 0; t0(a) > 0, t00(a) < 0;
t0(0) =1; t0(1) = 0. We make an assumption on the relationship between t(a) and
5We maintain the functional form in Bennett and Iossa (2006) for simplicity. It is possible to
consider a more general functional form of social benet by allowing the cross-terms between a and
e. One can show that this assumption is not crucial in driving the main results.
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d(a; e).
A1 t0(a) + d1(a; e) > 0.
This assumption implies that, although we entertain the possibility that a in-
creases the operational cost, this negative externality is only moderate.6
Notice that the rst-best investments (a; e) satisfy the following two equations:
u0(a) + t0(a) + d1(a; e) = 1 (1)
and
v0(e) + d2(a; e) = 1: (2)
We assume that unique, interior solutions to these two equations exist.
Assume that both innovative activities a and e are observable so that, once chosen,
there is no ambiguity about their values. These investments, however, could be non-
veriable so that no contracts can be made contingent on them. Whereas these
assumptions are standard in the literature, what is novel here is that we assume that
e is interim contractible; that is, e is contractible if and only if a has been chosen. The
underlying reason is that once the facility is built, such fundamentals as operational
costs or social benets become describable.7
            
Figure 1 about here
             -
The game can be summarized by a sequence of events by the time line in Figure
1. At time 0, the regime is determined. The various regimes include: separation with
builder ownership (SB), separation with manager ownership (SM), separation with
public ownership (SP ), integration with consortium ownership (IC), and integration
with public ownership (IP ) (where separation means unbundling and integration
means bundling). Moreover, the government can only sign contracts that specify
the minimum standards and promise xed payments based on such default values as
C0; B0; and R0.
At time 0.5, investment a is chosen. At time 1, after the chosen a becomes
observable, the builder (or the consortium) bargains with the owner over the adoption
6Similar assumption is used in Bennett and Iossa (2006). As will be clear, this assumption ensures
that if the consortium owns the facility it is always in his interest to adopt a.
7Since we here do not assume any contracting frictions due to limited liability or risk aversion, a
contract conditional on the level of operational cost is equivalent to that conditional on the level of
e.
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of a. At time 2, the requirements on the operation task become revealed. Two events
take place in a sequence: the government may rst negotiate with the builder (or the
consortium) on the subsequent adoption of e, and then contracts with the manager
(or the consortium) on the level of e to be chosen.8 At time 2.5, investment e is
chosen. At time 3, in case no agreement on the adoption of e was reached at time
2, the involved parties may bargain over the adoption of e. (Note that, while not
occurring in the equilibrium path, the negotiation problem at time 3 determines the
threat points for the negotiation problem at time 2.) At time 4, the contractual
relationship between the government and the agents ends, and all the payo¤s are
realized. As explained, we assume that bargaining is always bilateral, despite three
stakeholders under some regimes.9 We also note that the costs of investing a or e are
sunk once the investment is made.
We apply the Nash bargaining solution to calculate each partys payo¤ in a ne-
gotiation; the two involved parties are assumed to have equal ex post bargaining
power. Two special features of the bargaining solution are worth mentioning. First,
to best compare and contrast our results, we follow Bennett and Iossa (2006) in as-
suming that if the investor is the owner, he cannot commit not to implement his own
investment (i.e., his investment will be implemented without going through any bar-
gaining); on the other hand, whenever the investor and the owner are not the same,
they will negotiate on the adoption of the investment. Second, we assume that, the
owner cannot unilaterally use the innovation without the agreement of the investor.10
We end with a comment about the governments objective. Here we assume that
the governments payo¤ is equal to the social benet minus payments made to the
rm(s), plus the residual value if she is also the owner. In this regard, her objective
is di¤erent from a benevolent social planner in typical welfare analysis. It should
be noted that, however, in the framework of interim contractibility, regardless of the
ownership and organizational structure, the government will succeed in ensuring the
investment and adoption of the e¢ cient level of e. Given a, the e¢ cient level of e,
8Here we implicitly assume that, in case of unbundling, the solo manager will be recruited by the
government at time 2.
9 In the builder ownership case, for instance, the stakeholders are the builder, the operator, and
the government. One can imagine a scenario in which the three parties bargain among themselves
at some point of time. Whereas such a setting is reasonable and deserves studies, it is beyond the
scope of this paper.
10 It should be noticed that this assumption, while also used in Bennett and Iossa (2006), is in
contrast with Aghion and Tirole (1994). An underlying reason is that the investment has some
component of human capital, which makes it impossible to materialize without its investors nal
cooperation.
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denoted by e(a), is given by
v0(e(a)) + d2(a; e(a)) = 1: (3)
The reason is that, since e becomes contractible at time 2, it is the involved par-
ties common interest to maximize the surplus to be divided in the corresponding
negotiation.
3 Interim contractibility
3.1 Investments under private ownership
In this subsection, ownership is assumed to be allocated to some investor. There
are three possible regimes  separation with builder ownership, separation with
manager ownership, and integration with consortium ownership. Here, we do not
consider the manager-ownership case, since it is at least weakly dominated by some
other regime. The intuition is simple. Given that e is interim contractible, the
manager is always provided with the right incentive to invest. While not improving
this incentive further, conferring ownership to the manager complicates matters due
to the likelihood that the builders investment incentive is reduced. Thus, so long as
no confusion is caused, we refer interchangeably to the builder-ownership case and to
the separation case under private ownership.
3.1.1 Ownership by the builder
Suppose that the tasks of building and operation are contracted out separately, and
the builder owns the facility. By using backward induction to solve this game, we rst
analyze the operating stage. Figure 2 illustrates the timing of the events that occur
in this stage. In particular, since the builder has the veto power on the adoption
of investment e, he may negotiate with the government on this issue at the end of
operating stage (i.e., time 3).11 However, given the interim contractibility of e, such
negotiation may not necessarily happen, if the government could solicit the builders
agreement on the adoption of e prior to its choice. In this sense, the negotiation on
the ex ante approval of e (at time 2) replaces the negotiation on the ex post adoption
11We assume that the government would represent the manager in the negotiation with the builder,
whenever it occurs. The justication is that, given the interim contractibility of e, no matter whether
the government or the manager is involved in a bargaining, their interests could be perfectly aligned
prior to the bargaining. It also explains why both the social benet and the operational cost are
considered in such a bargaining.
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of e (at time 3). To better analyze the former negotiation, we rst study the latter
negotiation (which occurs only in case that the former negotiation breaks down).
         
Figure 2 about here
         
time 3 We only consider the subgame following the history that no agreement was
reached at time 2. In this subgame, given the adopted a and the chosen e, the
builder will negotiate with the government on the adoption of e. If such negotiation
breaks down and e is not adopted, in the operating stage, the builder gains nothing,
while the government pays the operational cost C(a; 0);12 however, if the agreement
is achieved, the net surplus created equals [v (e)  C (a; e) + C(a; 0)]. Through the
Nash bargaining, they will agree to adopt e, dividing the net surplus equally. Thus,
the builders gains from such bargaining, denoted by fOb ; are calculated as follows.
fOb =
1
2
[v (e)  C (a; e) + C (a; 0)] : (4)
time 2.5 The manager will invest the level of e which is exactly specied in the
contract (signed at time 2).
time 2 At time 2, there are two events occurring in a sequence: the government
rst negotiates with the builder on the subsequent adoption of e, and then signs a
complete contract with the manager on the choice of e.
To analyze the negotiation between the government and builder, we rst consider
the case in which these two parties fail to achieve an agreement on the choice and
adoption of e at time 2. In this case, foreseeing the negotiation that will happen at
time 3, the government will force the manager to choose a level of e (denoted by eOSB)
that maximizes her payo¤, which is the social benet of e, v (e), minus the payment
to the builder, 12 [v (e)  C (a; e) + C (a; 0)], as well as the payment to the manager,
12The operational cost is directly borne by the manager, but it could be transferred from the
government to the manager through the complete contracting on e. So given that no contracting
friction exists and that the manager always ends up with a payo¤ of 0, the government indirectly
bears all the costs incurred in the operating stage.
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[e+ C (a; e)].13 Thus, the choice of eOSB satises
1
2

v0(eOSB(a)) + d2(a; e
O
SB(a))

= 1: (5)
Note that eOSB(a) is necessarily smaller than the e¢ cient level e(a), and that eOSB(a)
will help dene the threat points of the negotiation occurring immediately before.
Now consider the case in which the builder agrees with the government on the
ex ante approval of e at time 2. In this case, any chosen e will be adopted at time
3 without going through further negotiation, so the government will sign a contract
with the manager to implement the e¢ cient level e(a). Thus, the agreement in the
time-2 negotiation creates net surplus, which is

[v (e)  C (a; e)  e]  v  eOSB  C  a; eOSB  eOSB	 ;
thus, through Nash bargaining, the builder is going to obtain one half of this net
surplus plus his threat point payo¤ fOb (dened in (4) and evaluated at e = e
O
SB). In
other words, his net gains in the operating stage are
1
2

v (e)  C (a; e) + C (a; 0) + eOSB   e : (6)
time 1 Being the owner, the builder will unilaterally implement his chosen a, be-
cause he always gets a positive payo¤ and in accordance with Bennett and Iossa
(2006), the owner cannot commit not to implement his own investment.
time 0.5 When the builder decides on a, he knows that his chosen a will be adopted.
Therefore, his objective is simply to maximize fb, which is the residual value plus his
net gains in the operating stage (dened in (6)), minus the cost of investment a.
fb = R (a) +
1
2

v (e)  C (a; e) + C (a; 0) + eOSB   e  a:
Hence, understanding that both e and eOSB are functions of his choice, his optimal
choice aSB satises
t0 (aSB) +
1
2

d1 (aSB; e)  d1 (aSB; 0) + deOSB
da

+
1
2

v0 (e) + d2 (aSB; e)  1 de
da
= 1:
13The transfer to the builder is paid in the negotiation that happens at time 3; the transfer to the
manager is paid when the complete contract is signed at time 2, and the exact payment is to cover
all the costs of the manager.
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Making use of (3), we obtain
t0(aSB) +
1
2
[d1(aSB; e)  d1(aSB; 0)] + 1
2
@eOSB
@a
= 1: (7)
Since aSB, together with e and eSB, is determined by (3), (5), and (7), there are
several interesting observations. First, the function u(:) does not appear in any of the
three equations, and hence aSB is independent of u(:). In other words, the builder
fails to internalize the social benet of his investment. Second, totally di¤erentiating
(5), we obtain
@eOSB
@a
=   d21(a; e
O
SB)
v00(eOSB) + d22(a; e
O
SB)
: (8)
It indicates that, an increase in a leads to an increase in eOSB in case of complemen-
tarity and to a reduction of eOSB in case of substitutability.
Third, from (7), aSB is increased by task complementarity (when @eOSB=@a > 0
and d1(aSB; e)  d1(aSB; 0) > 0) and is decreased by task substitutability (when
@eOSB=@a < 0 and d1(aSB; e)  d1(aSB; 0) < 0). The intuition is that, through the
negotiation with the government (at time 2), the builder shares the benets generated
by e, and his gains are in turn related to the default choice eOSB. In more detail,
in the event of bargaining breakdown, a greater eOSB enlarges the surplus equally
shared between the government and the builder, while rising the cost of operating
investment, which is borne by the government alone. So a greater eOSB enhances
the relative bargaining position of the builder. Thus, if a and e are complements,
the solo builder is given additional incentive to invest aSB in order to induce the
government to choose a higher level of eOSB. This explains why complementarity
favors the investment of a under the builders ownership.
3.1.2 Ownership by the consortium
Suppose a consortium undertakes both building and operation and also owns the
facility. To solve the game, we use backward induction. We rst notice that, in the
operating stage, once the consortium has chosen e, he will adopt it. The govern-
ment is not concerned that such investment is not adopted. She however needs to
be concerned whether the "right" level of investment is made. Given the interim
contractibility of e, the government and consortium could negotiate on the level of
investment e prior to its choice (i.e., at time 2). If no agreement is achieved in such
negotiation, the consortium would (at time 2.5) ignore the social benet and set
12
e = eOIC(a), satisfying
d2(a; e
O
IC(a)) = 1: (9)
Totally di¤erentiating (9), we obtain
@eOIC
@a
=  d21(a; e
O
IC)
d22(a; eOIC)
. (10)
Clearly, eOIC(a)  e(a). So the government and the consortium will sign a contract
that leads to the e¢ cient level e(a), which ensures the greatest surplus to be divided
in negotiation (at time 2).
Back at the building stage. Analogical to the builder-ownership case, the invest-
ment a would be adopted by the consortium without going through any bargaining.14
So at time 0.5, the consortium will maximize his payo¤ by choosing a = aIC , which
satises
t0(aIC) +
1
2

d1(aIC ; e) + d1(aIC ; eOIC)  12v0(eOIC)@eOIC@a = 1: (11)
(See Appendix A for detailed derivation.)
Notice that aIC , together with e and eOIC , is determined by (3), (9), and (11).
There are two interesting observations. First, the function u(:) does not appear in
any of the three equations. Hence, aIC is independent of u(:), which means that the
consortium also fails to internalize the social benet of a. Second, from (11), aIC
is decreased by task complementarity (when @eOIC=@a > 0) and is increased by task
substitutability (when @eOIC=@a < 0). The intuition is that, the consortiums gains
from the bargaining with the government (at time 2) depend on his default choice
eOIC . A higher level of e
O
IC implies less improvement in social benets through the
bargaining, enhancing the relative bargaining position of the government.15 Thus, if
a and e are complements, the consortium would further underinvest aIC , in order to
lower the default choice of eOIC and to extract more subsidies from the government.
In summary, in both SB and IC regimes, while the social benet of a is equally
ignored, the task interdependence plays contrasting roles in the determination of a.
14As guaranteed by A1, the adoption of a always yields positive gains to consortium, so the
bargaining does not occur on this issue.
15Although an increase in eOIC lowers the operational cost and this e¤ect benets the consortium,
it incurs more costs of operating investment borne by the consortium alone. As shown in (9), when
the consortium chooses eOIC to maximize his threat point payo¤, these two e¤ects are cancelled out
in the marginal level. So we have explained that an increase in eOIC is less likely to enhance the
bargaining position of the consortium than that of the government.
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3.2 Investment under public ownership
3.2.1 Separation and public ownership
Suppose that the builder and the manager are two separate agents, and that the
government is the owner of the facility. We use backward induction. First consider
the operating stage. When the government contracts (at time 2) with the manager,
she has already internalized all the benets and costs generated by e. As a result, she
chooses the e¢ cient level, e(a), which satises (3); it is simply meaningless to adjust
to any other level of e.
We then move back to the building stage. Subsequent to the choice of a, there
is a negotiation between the builder and the government on its adoption. If a is
not adopted, the builder ends up with nothing except the default contract payment,
while the government has to set e = e(0) and ends up with a continuation payo¤
[R(0) +B (0; e(0))  C (0; e(0))  e(0)].16 However, if the two parties reach an agree-
ment on the adoption of a, the total surplus generated is [R(a) +B (a; e(a))  C (a; e(a))  e(a)].
Using the Nash bargaining solution, the payo¤ of the builder is denoted by fb and
calculated as follows.
fb =
1
2
[t(a) + u(a) + v(e(a)) + d(a; e(a))  e(a)
 v(e(0))  d(0; e(0)) + e(0)]  a:
Anticipating such bargaining and its impact, the builder will maximize fb subject to
(3) by choosing a = aSP , which satises
1
2

u0(aSP ) + t0(aSP ) + d1(aSP ; e) = 1: (12)
Altogether, aSP , as well as e, is determined by (3) and (12). Compared with the
rst-order condition for the rst-best a, we nd that now the marginal benet of
investing a is half as under the rst-best case. Consequently, aSP < a. In contrast
with private ownership, now the social benet of a, represented by u(:), is taken
into account. Nonetheless, task interdependence is irrelevant. The underlying reason
traces to the following facts: through the negotiation with the government (at time
1), the builder may share some benets generated by investment e; however, in such
bargaining, the threat point of the builder is dened by the payo¤ when aSP is not
16Since the government could sign a complete contract with the manager to implement e(0) (and
there are no frictions in contracting), the former party would perfectly internalize the payo¤ of the
latter party. In particular, the transfer made from the government to the manager could only cover
the costs incurring to the latter party, which is [C (0; e(0)) + e(0)].
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adopted (i.e., a = 0), so his relative bargaining position is independent of the choice
of aSP as well as the interaction between a and e.
3.2.2 Integration and public ownership
Suppose that a consortium is in charge of the building and operation, and that the
government has the ownership. In contrast with the SP regime, the negotiations
in the IP regime are triggered not only by the adoption of investment a, but also
by the contracting of investment e. Nonetheless, in what follows, we will show that
these two regimes are equivalent as far as the equilibrium choices of investments are
concerned. While the detailed analysis is relegated to the Appendix A, we sketch an
outline here.
First, consider the operating stage. The timing of events occurring in this stage
is much similar with that depicted in Figure 2. If the agreement on the choice and
adoption of e is reached in the negotiation at time 2, the negotiation may not happen
again at time 3. But the latter negotiation determines the threat points of the former
negotiation. In case that no ex ante approval on the adoption of e is solicited from
government (at time 2), the consortium will at time 2.5 set e = eOIP (a), which solves
1
2

v0(eOIP (a)) + d2(a; e
O
IP (a))

= 1: (13)
Totally di¤erentiating (13), we obtain
@eOIP
@a
=   d21(a; e
O
IP )
v00(eOIP ) + d22(a; e
O
IP )
: (14)
Obviously, eOIP (a) < e(a) and it is benecial for the government and the consortium to
sign a contract that sets e = e(a) at the beginning of the operating stage (i.e., at time
2). Negotiation takes place accordingly. Given such bargaining and the bargaining
triggered by the approval of a, the payo¤ of the consortium is calculated as follows.
f =
1
2

t(a) + u(a) + v(e(a)) + d(a; e(a))  e(a)  eOIP (0)  a: (15)
Thus, the consortium maximizes f subject to (3) and (13) by choosing a = aIP ,
which satises
1
2

u0(aIP ) + t0(aIP ) + d1(aIP ; e) = 1: (16)
Altogether, aIP , as well as e, is determined by (3) and (16). Notice that aIP = aSP <
a, and the two regimes are equivalent in terms of investment choices. The underlying
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reason is that, under the public ownership, the government always has veto power on
the ex post adoption of a, so negotiation happens on this issue and plays a key role in
shaping the incentive of the investor in the building stage. Through such negotiation
and given the interim contractibility, either the solo builder or the consortium could
shares one half of the net surplus generated by a, while his threat point is independent
of the choice of a. These facts, altogether, explain that the di¤erence between the
regimes on the choice of a vanishes.
3.3 Optimal regime
Interim contractibility of e, which ensures that e is always e¢ ciently chosen, allows
us to focus solely on a in our comparison of alternative regimes. In case of underin-
vestment of a in all alternative regimes, the optimal regime is the one that yields the
greatest a. We have already noted that, a is obviously under-invested under the two
public regimes considered and that the investments under the two private regimes
considered are independent of social benet e¤ect of a, i.e., u(a). However, the rst-
best level a is increasing in u0(:). Therefore, whenever u0(:) is high enough, there is
under-investment in all regimes.
To facilitate the discussion, we can parameterize u and t (the residual value),
by writing u(a) = U(a) and t(a) = !T (a), where U and T are the benchmark
social benet function and residual value function. An increase in  (or !) means an
increase in the importance of social benet (or residual value) given a. We use (; !)
to denote the problem under parameters  and !.
Lemma 1 (1) Given !, there exists  such that there is underinvestment of a in
all regimes if and only if  > .
(2) For all ! > 0, if there is underinvestment of a in all regimes under (; !),
then there is also underinvestment of a under (; !0), for any !0 > 0 and !0 6= !.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Part (1) suggests that whenever the social benet of a is su¢ ciently large (i.e., 
is su¢ ciently large), there always exists underinvestment problem, since such e¤ect is
not fully internalized by the investors. Part (2) suggests that the cuto¤  is indepen-
dent of !; or the residual value function t (:) does not play any role in determining
whether there is underinvestment of a in all regimes. The role of part (2) will be
made clearer soon.
The following proposition tells us whether bundling or unbundling of the two
tasks is more desirable.
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Proposition 1 Suppose that a is non-contractible, e is interim contractible, and
 > .
(1) Under private ownership, integration is better than separation for inducing both
a and e, if and only if, for all a 2 [min [aIC ; aSB] ;max [aIC ; aSB]] ;
d1(a; e
O
IC) + d1(a; 0) >  
d21(a; e
O
SB)
v00(eOSB) + d22(a; e
O
SB)
  v0(eOIC)
d21(a; e
O
IC)
d22(a; eOIC)
; (17)
where eOIC and e
O
SB are dened by (9) and (5), respectively.
(2) Under public ownership, integration is equivalent to separation for inducing both
a and e.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We rst consider part (1) of this proposition. Regarding (17), we notice that the
left hand side, LHS, is positive if and only if investment a has a cost-reduction e¤ect
on the operating stage. We can also verify that the right hand side, RHS, is positive
(negative) if there is complementarity (substitutability) between a and e. In other
words, complementarity between investments makes it more di¢ cult for integration to
dominate separation under private ownership, while substitutability makes it easier.
Thus, under private ownership, the desirability of bundling depends on both the
externality measured by the partial derivative d1(a; e) and the task interdependence
measured by cross derivatives d21(a; e).
The role of as cost-reduction e¤ect can be understood as follows. Suppose
d1(a; e) > 0. When deciding how much to invest in the building stage, the consor-
tium under integration is able to internalize the savings on operational costs, while
the builder under separation is not able to.17 Thus, a larger cost-reduction e¤ect of a
strengthens the incentive of the consortium, but not that of the builder. This part of
the result is consistent with that in Bennett and Iossa (2006) and also in Martimort
and Pouyet (2008).
The other part of the result is counter-intuitive, however. Despite a kind of pos-
itive externality, task complementary favors separation over integration under the
private ownership. The key to understanding relies on the fact that the government
may negotiate the choice of the operating investment with the builder or the con-
sortium at the interim stage (especially when its default choice deviates from the
17Although the builder can bargain with the government in the SB case, the threat points are
dened by the payo¤s after the adoption of a. The reason is that such bargaining is over contracting
of e at time 2, instead of adoption of a at time 1. Thus, the builder cannot internalize the savings
on operational costs through such bargaining.
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e¢ cient level). Consider the task complementary. In case of unbundling, the builder
would be happy if the default choice of operating investment is higher. The reason
is that when negotiating it to the e¢ cient level, a higher default level enables the
builder to share less costs of the operating investment but more benets generated.
This explains why the builder invests more in order to enhance the default choice of
operating investment as well as his bargaining position. However, in case of bundling,
the consortium would be unhappy if the default choice of the operating investment
is higher, since it reduces the subsidies exacted from the government when they re-
contract on the operating investment. Thus, he would further underinvest in the
building stage in order to secure a higher bargaining position consequently.
Now turn to part (2) of Proposition 1, which states that under public owner-
ship, neither task interdependence nor externality continues to shape the trade-o¤s
between integration and separation. The underlying reasons are three-folded. First,
under the public ownership, the government always has a say on the ex post adoption
of building investment, so the negotiation always happens on this issue. Second, in
such negotiation, the threat points of all parties are determined by the payo¤s when
the building investment is not adopted; so it explains why such investment, as well as
its interaction with the operating investment, cannot change its investors bargain-
ing position. Third, the interim contractibility of operating investment deprives the
bargaining power of the manager in case of unbundling; that means, whenever bar-
gaining takes place, the total surplus generated by the building investment is always
shared between the two parties: the government and the builder (or consortium),
which in turn explains that task externality plays no role in the distinction between
the integration and the separation under the public ownership.18
The following proposition answers whether or not the project should be privately
owned.
Proposition 2 Suppose that a is non-contractible, e is interim contractible, and
 > .
(1) Given the choice of integration, consortium ownership is better than public own-
18As for the impacts of externality under the public ownership, our result is in contrast with that
in Bennett and Iossa (2006). In their model, since investment e is assumed to be non-contractible all
the time, the solo manager indirectly shares certain part of benets generated by the adoption of a
under the SP regime. This explains why, in case of positive externality, the incentive of solo builder
is diluted, compared with the consortium. However, in our model, the interim contractibility of e
relieves the solo builder of such concern under the SP regime, since the manager would no longer be
able to appropriate any surplus generated by the adoption of a due to complete contracting.
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ership for inducing both a and e, if and only if, for all a 2 [min faIC ; aIP g ; max faIC ; aIP g] ;
t0(a)  u0(a) + d1(a; eOIC) >  v0(eOIC)
d21(a; e
O
IC)
d22(a; eOIC)
; (18)
where eOIC is dened by (9).
(2) Given the choice of separation, builder ownership is better than public ownership
for inducing both a and e, if and only if, for all a 2 [min faSB; aSP g ; max faSB; aSP g] ;
t0(a)  u0(a)  d1(a; 0) > d21(a; e
O
SB)
v00(eOSB) + d22(a; e
O
SB)
; (19)
where eOSB is dened by (5).
Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition implies that, in case of interim contractibility of e, when the
government considers whether the project should be privately owned, she should
consider not only the residual value e¤ect, the social benet e¤ect, and the cost-
reduction e¤ect of the building investment, but also task interdependence.19 The
following statements are true according to Proposition 2.
(a) Whether the tasks are integrated or separated, a larger residual value e¤ect fa-
vors private ownership, and a larger social benet e¤ect favors public ownership.
This result is consistent with that in Bennett and Iossa (2006).
(b) When the two tasks are integrated (separated), a larger cost-reduction e¤ect
of the building investment consolidates (reduces) the advantage of consortium
(builder) ownership, relative to public ownership.
(c) When the two tasks are integrated, greater investment complementarity (sub-
stitutability) attenuates (enhances) the advantage of consortium ownership rel-
ative to public ownership.
(d) When the two tasks are separated, greater investment complementarity (sub-
stitutability) enhances (attenuates) the advantage of builder ownership relative
to public ownership.
19Result 2 of Lemma 1 ensures that the t (:) function, or the coe¢ cient !, does not play any role
in determining whether a is underinvested in all regimes. Hence, given integration, we can always
choose a high (low) enough ! so that (i) a is underinvested in all regimes and (ii) IC ownership is
better (worse) than public ownership. A similar claim holds when the IC ownership is replaced by
SB ownership.
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We end with a few more comments. Firstly, the model presented here indeed
reects the frequent adaptation of contracts in PPPs. We attribute the driving force
of this phenomenon to interim contractibility, rather than falling into a conventional
discussion of the contract length. Provided that the contract is incomplete at the
outset, the resolved complexity is more likely to trigger renegotiation of the contract
terms. This point is also contrasted with that in Bajari and Tadelis (2001) and
Ellman (2006) who considered the renegotiation of contracts as a response to the
changes in demand or discovery of new service innovations. Secondly, provided that
e is interim contractible, the equilibrium choice of operating investment matches
with the e¢ cient level, but the incentive for building investment varies by virtue of
investment interdependence. In the next section, we will discuss to what extent the
results obtained here carry to the environment in which e is always non-contractible.
4 Non-contractibility
We have shown that task interdependence not only matters in the determination of
the optimal regime but also plays a counter-intuitive role. As this paper is partially
motivated by Bennett and Iossa (2006), it is useful to clarify whether the insights ob-
tained in our framework are generalizable to theirs, where the sequential investments,
a and e, are both non-contractible.
Analytically, one complication is that, without the assumption of interim con-
tractibility, e is commonly ine¢ ciently chosen in any ownership regime. Then the
determination of optimal regime requires comparison of both a and e, and it is dif-
cult without further specication of the model. However, if we focus solely on the
building problem, there is more we can say about. In an earlier version of this paper
(Chen and Chiu, 2009), we show that, in presence of task complementarity (substi-
tutability), it is more (less) likely that unbundling yields a greater a than bundling.
If a is underinvested in every possible regime and, from the governments point of
view, a is of far more importance than e, then it is indeed the case that separation
is a more (less) desirable arrangement than integration under task complementar-
ity (substitutability). In this sense, despite a somewhat di¤erent underlying reason,
the counter-intuitive role of task interdependence holds true in Bennett and Iossas
model. The intuition is as follows.
First consider the separation cases with the builders or the governments own-
ership. In these cases, since e is non-contractible, its adoption predicates ex post
bargaining, through which the builder can share partial benets generated by the
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managers investment while not bearing any cost of it.20 If a and e are complemen-
tary, a higher level of a would lead to a more e¢ cient level of e, enlarging the net
surplus to be split in the bargaining. Thus, by expecting more rents to (directly or
indirectly) be extracted from the manager, the builder would like to invest a greater
level of a. However, under the integration case where a unied agent takes charge
of building and operation, if the consortium invests a greater a, he would bear the
full cost of investing a greater e subsequently, while the benet of such investment is
shared by the government. Hence, at the margin, the consortiums incentive to invest
a is less enhanced by the complementarity than is the builders incentive.
It is useful to revisit the example of Private Finance Initiative (PFI) schools men-
tioned in Bennett and Iossa (2006). According to a report by the Audit Commission
(2003), the quality of traditionally procured schools is commonly better than that of
PFI schools.21 Bennett and Iossa (2006) provide an explanation to this phenomenon
by referring to the negative externality across the project phases. However, it is hard
to believe that a well-built facility in the school would by itself increase the opera-
tional costs. Alternatively, more valuable assets may induce the school managers to
exert more e¤orts to engage in maintenance, since failure to control vandalism now
causes more to be damaged and costs more for repairs. If the school builder happens
to be the manager (as under PFI), he may fear that more "managerial e¤orts" (in-
stead of direct operational costs) would be put into the operating stage.22 On the
contrary, a traditional procurement contract can relieve the school builder of such
a concern. This alternative story, which seems plausible, shows that, when PFI is
less favored, the tasks of construction and operation may exhibit certain degree of
complementarity, instead of negative externality.
5 Complete contracting
Our analysis has found that under two variant models of incomplete contracting
frameworks, bundling is disfavored by investment complementarity, it is natural to ask
if the same insight still exists in a complete contracting framework. In a framework
where both a and e are observable and contractible and no-renegotiation can be
20 In the separation with public ownership case, the builder can bargain with the government to
indirectly share the benets generated by the manager.
21As stated in Bennett and Iossa (2006), PFI refers to the IC regime and traditional procurement
refers to the SP regime.
22To better understand this point, it is also worthwhile distinguishing between the operational cost
and the cost incurred by managerial e¤ort. In the model of non-contractibility, the former cost is
transferable and can be deferred for payment after the bargaining over the adoption of e; the latter
cost cannot be transferred and has already been sunk before that bargaining.
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committed to, the government can simply enforce the rst-best a and e using take-
it-or-leave-it o¤ers. In this sense, the organization structure becomes an irrelevant
issue. To make the question more interesting, it would be useful to focus on models
in which certain frictions, such as risk aversion and limited liability, are present
in the contracting process. To this end, we rst turn to Martimort and Pouyet
(2008), who show that, in a complete contracting framework, the cost reduction
e¤ect of the building e¤ort favors bundling over unbundling. Extending this model
with task interdependence, we argue that integration tends to be favored by task
complementarity, in contrast with our earlier result.
5.1 Risk aversion
We follow Martimort and Pouyet (2008) closely. In their problem, a building invest-
ment, a, and an operating investment, e, are undertaken in a sequence, with costs
a2=2 and e2=2; respectively. We assume that, in case of integration, a unied agent is
in charge of investing both a and e; in case of separation, two agents, namely, builder
and manager, are in charge of investing a and e respectively. (Since there is no rene-
gotiation, we do not consider the regime where one agent is the owner and hires the
other agent.) Given a and e, the following building quality (Q) and operational cost
(C) are resulted:
Q = a+ "; (20)
C =    e  a  ae; (21)
where " () are random shock normally distributed with mean zero (0) and variance
2" (
2
), and  and  are two coe¢ cients. When  = 0, the model is exactly the
same as Martimort and Pouyet (2008); in this case,  > 0 ( < 0) means positive
(negative) externality across stages: an increase in a leads to a reduction (an increase)
in operational cost. The task interdependence is brought in by a non-zero : if  > 0
( < 0), a and e are complementary (substitute) investments.23 The builder and the
manager in the separation regime, as well as the builder-manager in the integration
regime, have the same constant-absolute-risk-aversion utility function with coe¢ cient
r.24
23When  = 0, a has cost reduction e¤ect if and only if  > 0. Notice that @C=@a =   e. Once
 6= 0, a has cost reduction e¤ect if and only if  >  e; that means, whether a has cost reduction
e¤ect does not depend solely on .
24We interpret that a single agent serves both the role of building and managing in the integration
regime, as it is assumed in the main part of Martimort and Pouyet (2008). They also study the case
of consortium in which the builder and the manager mutually risk insure each other. The role of risk
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Two remarks are in order here. First, we assume that, despite the non-contractibility
of a and e, the building quality (Q) and operational cost (C) are contractible. Equally
important is that the parties are able to commit to no re-negotiation. This frame-
work is thus rightly called a complete contracting framework. Second, we assume
that there is social benet associated with project, denoted by S  Q, where S is a
parameter reecting the size of the social benet.
Following Martimort and Pouyet (2008), we restrict ourselves to linear contracts.
Under the integration regime, the following linear contract is signed with the consor-
tium (builder-manager):
	(Q;C) =  + Q  C; (22)
where  is interpreted as an aggregate xed-fee payment and  and  piece-rate
parameters. Under the separation regime, a pair of linear contracts are signed with
the builder (b) and manager (m), respectively,
	i(Q;C) = i + iQ  iC; (23)
where i is interpreted as a xed-fee payment and i and i piece-rate parameters,
where i = b;m. Obviously, m = 0, since the managers investment, e, does not im-
pact the quality and any non-zero m would expose unnecessary risk to the manager.
Let aI and eI denote the consortiums choices under the integration regime; aS
and eS denote the builders and managers choices under the separation regime.
Lemma 2 Given contracts as stipulated in (22) and (23), the equilibrium choices are
given by:
aI =  + + eI; (24)
eI = + aI: (25)
aS = b + b + e
Sb; (26)
eS = m + a
Sm: (27)
Proof. See the Appendix.
We can show the following proposition regarding the case of task complementarity.
Proposition 3 Suppose  = 0 and  > 0 and linear contracts are used. Consider
any pair of contracts under separation so that the builders and managers individual
insurance among agents is well known in the literature (see, e.g., Varian, 1990; Itoh, 1994). Chiu and
Chou (2009) is a recent piece applying this idea to organization design in the context of o¤shoring
and outsourcing.
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rationality (IR) constraints just bind. Then there always exists a contract under
integration so that the builder-managers IR constraint is satised, the same risk
premium under the separating contracts is paid, and the equilibrium choices satisfy:
aI > aS and eI > eS.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The proposition suggests that, if a and e are complementary investments, given
any pair of unbundling contracts, we can always nd a bundling contract that is more
desirable in the sense that it generates the same level of distortion (i.e., risk premium)
but induces a higher level of incentives. In other words, it gives an intuitive result that
task complementarity favors integration over separation, in terms of alleviating the
underinvestment problem. In other words, a unied agent is easier to be motivated
since the agency cost is relatively lower in case of task complementarity.
The underlying rationale of the proposition is as follows. Notice that the risk
premium under integration equals 22" + 
22, while the total risk premia under
separation equals 2b
2
"+
 
2b + 
2
m

2: Suppose  = b. Then the equal-risk premium
condition implies that   b and   m; where the two equalities cannot hold at
the same time. Using (24) to (27), we immediately conclude that aS < aI and eS < eI .
Therefore, despite the same risk premium and that the relevant IR constraints bind,
the integration regime dominates the separating regime by better mitigating the
underinvestment problem. The intuition is that, given the risk premium, under the
separation regime, each agent is given a weaker incentive (b   and m  ) to
respond to the other agents investment.
While Proposition 3 is concerned about task complementarity, the corresponding
result regarding task substitutability is more di¢ cult to obtain. The reason is that a
and e normally change in opposite directions from one contractual regime to another,
rendering the comparison di¢ cult without further specication.
5.2 Limited liability
Despite the nding in the last subsection, the conventional understanding that task
complementarity favors integration need not always hold even under complete con-
tracting. Schmitz (2005) studies a sequential moral hazard model where control
actions are contractible and limited liability is the source of agency problem. Assum-
ing the e¤ort in the rst stage makes the e¤ort in the second stage more e¤ective (i.e.,
reduces the latters marginal cost or increases its marginal benet), the author nds
that, when she needs to induce high e¤orts, the principal might need to pay a greater
agency cost to the integrated agent under bundling than to the two separate agents
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under unbundling.25 In other words, this result predicts that task complementarity
disfavors bundling.
Note that Schmitzs counter-intuitive result is due to the fact that the rst-stage
e¤ort alters the agency rent generated by the second-stage e¤ort. To a certain extent,
this underlying force also exists in our interim contracting framework (as well as the
incomplete contracting framework in Bennett and Iossa, 2006). It is nonetheless
absent in Martimort and Pouyet (2008), since when moral hazard problem arises
from risk aversion, premium is paid only to cover the agentsutility loss in bearing
risks, and their utilities always match with their reservation levels. In this sense, the
agency rent in the following stage cannot be altered by the investment in the previous
stage.
6 Conclusion
This paper has reexamined the proper scope of public-private partnerships in the
context of a project consisting of two tasks, such as construction and operation of
a facility. The focus of analysis has been the role of task or investment interde-
pendence, i.e., the two investments are either complements or substitutes. Whether
the operation investment is non-contractible or interim contractible, we have found
that investment interdependence is a determinant of the optimal PPPs. In partic-
ular, favored by the cost-reduction e¤ect of the building investment, integration is
nonetheless disfavored by investment complementarity. While the focus of this paper
is on the interim contractibility framework, in which the second, operation task is
contractible subsequent to the building stage, we have also argued that weaker but
similar insights hold true in the incomplete contracting framework in the fashion of
Bennett and Iossa (2006).
These ndings regarding the role of task interdependence, while counter-intuitive,
contributes to the understanding of one empirical puzzle raised in the literature. In a
framework of investment externality but not investment interdependence, unbundled
projects are rationalized by negative externality. Despite a theoretical possibility,
examples of negative externality are relatively rare (see Iossa and Martimort, 2008).
However, in our framework where investment interdependence is also allowed, un-
bundled projects can now be rationalized by weak positive externality together with
strong complementarity. Our theory thus provides an alternative explanation to the
25According to Schmitz (2005), when tasks are bundled, the agent might be tempted to shirk in the
rst stage, since by doing so he could increase the rents obtained in the second stage. The underlying
reason is that the agency rent resulting from limited liability problem becomes larger when the e¤ect
of e¤ort on the success probability is reduced.
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phenomena. For example, the undesirable performance of PFI schools can be due to
the fact that a better tness might give rise to a higher value of guide service. In
other cases involving high technology, such as IT projects, because more advanced
and innovative system usually comes up with higher degree of complexity, more e¤ort
is required for the operator in learning how to handle it e¢ ciently. The complemen-
tarity between building and operating thus weakens the advantage of bundling these
tasks.
On the other hand, in such sectors as prison, waste disposal, transport and hos-
pital, sequential investments of building and operating might exhibit certain level of
substitutability. According to a report by National Audit O¢ ce (2003) in the United
Kingdom, compared to traditional procurement, PFI prisons tend to improve perfor-
mance and save costs. The reason is that innovative design solutions help reduce the
level of sta¢ ng needed to ensure security in prison. The underlying reason may be
the substitutability between building and operating, as much as the positive exter-
nality. In the waste disposal sector, a very well designed garbage-categorizing system
may conceivably lessen the burden of garbage collectors and cleaners. According to
our theory, bundling the tasks of designing and operating is favored in this case. In
the transport sector, if an electronic eye system located in proper places along each
highway is of very good quality, detection of speedsters may not demand much ef-
fort from the police or other rosters. Similarly, these tasks are better contracted out
in a bundle. Because construction and management of many public projects often
demonstrate interdependence, our model provides a greater latitude to understand
and interpret real world phenomena.
We end with some comments on the role of the contracting framework. If project
quality and cost are available for contracting upon but the agents are risk averse,
the conventional insight that task complementarity favors bundling holds true. On
the other hand, if agency problem stems from limited liability, or if the contract is
incomplete to a certain degree (non-contractible or interim contractible) and ex post
bargaining is unavoidable, it is possible that task complementarity favors unbundling.
The lesson is that when delegating public project to private sectors, the government
should condition her decisions on the features of contracting environment and agency
problem.
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Appendix A: Detail about the rst-order conditions de-
rived in Section 3
A.1 Ownership by the consortium
We solve the game by backward induction. The latest interesting time in this problem
is at time 2. Due to the consortiums ownership, once e is chosen at time 2.5, the
consortium himself will adopt it at time 3 without going through any negotiation.
time 2 Now the government negotiates with the consortium on the choice of e, given
the adopted a. In case that no agreement is reached, the consortium will choose
e = eOIC(a) satisfying (9), and hence obtain
 C  a; eOIC  eOIC in the operating
stage; in the meanwhile, the government obtains v
 
eOIC

. However, in case that the
consortium agrees with the government to choose the e¢ cient level e = e(a), the net
surplus generated is

v (e)  v  eOIC  C (a; e) + C  a; eOIC  e+ eOIC	 :
Through the Nash bargaining, the net surplus is divided equally, and the consortium
accepts one half of it in exchange for agreeing to choose e(a). So the consortiums
net gains in the operating stage are
1
2

v (e)  v  eOIC  C (a; e)  C  a; eOIC  e  eOIC	 :
time 1 The investment a would be adopted without any negotiation occurring.
time 0.5 At this time, the consortiums objective is to choose a to maximize f as
follows.
f = R (a) +
1
2

v (e)  v  eOIC  C (a; e)  C  a; eOIC  e  eOIC	  a:
Subject to e satisfying (3) and eOIC satisfying (9), the rst-order condition is (11) as
stated in the main text.
A.2 Integration and public ownership
We solve the game by backward induction.
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time 3 Consider the subgame following the history that no agreement was signed
at time 2 on the adoption of e. The government and the consortium would bargain
over the adoption of e now. If bargaining breaks down again, in the operating stage,
the consortium bears the operational cost C (a; 0) and the government obtains noth-
ing; however, if agreement is reached and e is adopted, the net surplus created is
[v (e)  C (a; e) + C (a; 0)]. Hence, through Nash bargaining, sharing one half of net
surplus, the consortium obtains 12 [v (e)  C (a; e)  C (a; 0)] in this case.
time 2.5 If the agreement was reached in the time-2 negotiation on the choice
and adoption of e, the consortium only implements the contract signed with the
government. However, if no agreement was reached before, the consortium will take
his own discretion to choose e; in this case, he needs to maximize his net gains
(after the negotiation at time 3), which are

1
2 [v (e)  C (a; e)  C (a; 0)]  e
	
, so
the optimal choice eOIP satises the rst-order condition (13), as stated in the main
text.
time 2 Now the government negotiates with the consortium on the choice and
subsequent adoption of e. If such bargaining breaks down, eOIP will be chosen and
adopted, the consortiums net gains in the operating stage are
1
2

v
 
eOIP
  C  a; eOIP   C (a; 0)  eOIP ;
and the governments net gains are 12

v
 
eOIP
  C  a; eOIP + C (a; 0). If the agree-
ment is reached, they will choose e = e to maximize the surplus generated, which is
[v (e)  C (a; e)  e]. Thus, they will agree on e at time 2. Through Nash Bargaining
and sharing the net surplus equally, in the operating stage, the consortium gains
1
2

v(e)  C(a; e)  C(a; 0)  e  eOIP  ;
and the government gains 12

v(e)  C(a; e) + C(a; 0)  e+ eOIP .
time 1 At time 1, the consortium is negotiating with the government on the adop-
tion of investment a. If such bargaining breaks down, the consortium will end up
with a continuation payo¤
1
2

v(e(0))  C(0; e(0))  C(0; 0)  e(0)  eOIP (0) ;
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while the government will end up with a continuation payo¤
1
2

v(e(0))  C(0; e(0)) + C(0; 0)  e(0) + eOIP (0)+R (0) :
However, if the agreement is reached and a is adopted, the total surplus created is
[u(a) + v (e(a))  C (a; e(a))  e(a) +R(a)] :
By using the Nash bargaining solution and dividing the net surplus equally, we could
calculate the payo¤ of the consortium as exactly described in (15).
time 0.5 At time 0.5, the consortium chooses a = aIP to maximize his payo¤
f described in (15), subject to e satisfying (3), the rst-order condition is exactly
described in (16).
Appendix B: Proofs
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Part (1). Compare (1), where a is solved, with (12) and (16), where aSP
and aIP are solved. Notice that they are identical except for a one-half coe¢ cient
in the LHS of the latter two equations (as a function of a, e in (1) and e in (12)
and (16) are the same). As a result, a > aSP = aIP , and no additional condition
is needed to ensure the underinvestment of a under public ownership regimes. Next
notice that under the "ownership by the builder" case, aSB, along with eOSB and e,
is determined by (7) and (5) and (3). It is interesting to notice that u(:) does not
appear in any of these three equations, and hence, aSB is independent of u(:). On
the other hand, (1), where a is solved, contains u0(:) = U 0(:) in the LHS, and hence
a can be made to be arbitrarily large by increasing . Hence, there must exist a
nite  so that for all  > , aSB < a. The case of "ownership by the consortium"
regime is similar and omitted. The claim is thus proved.
Part (2). Note that the term t0(:) appears in the rst order conditions of solving
a, aSB andaIC . This means function t (:) does not play any role in a¤ecting relative
magnitude of these choices of a. Finally, as noticed earlier, the choices of a under the
two public ownership regimes are always less than a. Regarding this, t (:) also does
not play any role as well.
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B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We start with the rst result. Suppose that aIC > aSB. Notice that all the
second-order conditions are satised. Then, making use of the rst-order condition
for the choice of aIC (see (11)), we know that, for a 2 [aSB; aIC ],
t0(a) +
1
2

d1(a; e(a)) + d1(a; eOIC (a))  12v0(eOIC (a))@eOIC (a)@a  1;
where the equality holds only when a = aIC ; making use of the rst-order condition
for the choice of aSB (see (7)), we also know that, for a 2 [aSB; aIC ],
t0(a) +
1
2
[d1(a; e(a))  d1(a; 0)] + 1
2
@eOSB (a)
@a
 1;
where the equality holds only when a = aSB. Therefore, by subtracting the second
inequality from the the rst, we obtain the following result:
aIC > aSB ) d1(a; eOIC (a))+d1(a; 0) >
@eOSB (a)
@a
+v0(eOIC (a))
@eOIC (a)
@a
for all a 2 [aSB; aIC ] :
(28)
Suppose that aIC < aSB. In the similar manner, we obtain the following result:
aIC < aSB ) d1(a; eOIC (a))+d1(a; 0) <
@eOSB (a)
@a
+v0(eOIC (a))
@eOIC (a)
@a
for all a 2 [aIC ; aSB] :
(29)
Finally, by combining (28) and (29) and making use of (10) and (8), we obtain the
claimed result.
The second result, i.e., the equivalence result under public ownership, is obtained
in a similar manner by comparing (16) and (12) and the proof is omitted.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We start with the rst result. Suppose that aIC > aIP . Notice that all the
second-order conditions are satised. Then, making use of the rst-order condition
for the choice of aIC (see (11)), we know that, for a 2 [aIP ; aIC ],
t0(a) +
1
2

d1(a; e(a)) + d1(a; eOIC (a))  12v0(eOIC (a))@eOIC (a)@a  1;
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where the equality holds only when a = aIC ; making use of the rst-order condition
for the choice of aIP (see (16)), we also know that, for all a 2 [aIP ; aIC ],
1
2

u0(a) + t0(a) + d1(a; e)  1;
where the equality holds only when a = aIP . Therefore, subtracting the second
inequality from the rst and rearranging, we obtain the following result:
aIC > aIP ) t0(a) u0(a)+d1(a; eOIC (a)) v0(eOIC (a))
@eOIC (a)
@a
> 0 for all a 2 [aIP ; aIC ] :
(30)
Suppose that aIC < aIP . In a similar manner, we could obtain the following result:
aIC < aIP ) t0(a) u0(a)+d1(a; eOIC (a)) v0(eOIC (a))
@eOIC (a)
@a
< 0 for all a 2 [aIC ; aIP ] :
(31)
By combining (30) and (31), and making use of (10) we show the claimed result.
As for the second result, i.e., (19), it is obtained by comparing (7) and (12). The
proof is much similar and hence omitted.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. In the bundling case, the consortium chooses a = aI and e = eI to maximize
the following payo¤
f =    0 + a+  (e+ a+ ae) 
1
2
r
 
22" + 
22
  1
2
a2   1
2
e2:
(Notice that the risk premium generated in this sort of contract is 12r
 
22" + 
22

.)
It can be veried that aI and eI as described in the Lemma are optimal. In the
unbundling case, the builder chooses a = aS to maximize his payo¤
fb = b   b0 + ba+ b (e+ a+ ae) 
1
2
r
 
2b
2
" + 
2
b
2

  1
2
a2;
the manager chooses e = eS to maximize his payo¤
fm = m   m0 + m (e+ a+ ae) 
1
2
r
 
2m
2

  1
2
e2:
It can be veried that aS and eS as described in the Lemma are optimal.
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B.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Let Cb (b; b) and Cm (m = 0; m) be the contracts under separation that
just satisfy the builder and managers IR constraints. (The IR constraints are satised
as long as the risk premia, which are independent of the actual investment choice, are
included.) Suppose  = 0. It is straightforward to show that the equilibrium choices
can be represented by
aS =  (b; b; m) 
b + bm
1  2bm
eS = ! (b; b; m) 
m (1 + b)
1  2bm
Under integration, we can construct a grand contract C (; ) such that  = b and
 =
q
2b + 
2
m > max fjbj ; jmjg. One can verify that such a bundling contract
C (; ) generates the same level of risk premium as the pair of unbundling contracts
Cb (b; b) and Cm (m = 0; m) in total, that is,
22" + 
22 = 
2
b
2
" +
 
2b + 
2
m

2: (32)
However, if  > 0, the equilibrium choices of the consortium with contract C (; )
can be represented by aI =  (; ; ) >  (b; b; m) = a
S , and eI = ! (; ; ) >
! (b; b; m) = e
S . In other words, a grand contract C (; ), with  equal to sum
of investment costs,
 
aI
2
=2 +
 
eI
2
=2, plus the equivalent risk premium, will be
acceptable for the consortium, and will implement aI > aS and eI > eS .
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Figure 2: The time line of the operation stage under builder ownership
